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Many infectious agents, especially those that cause emerging diseases, infect more than one host spe-
cies. Managing reservoirs of multihost pathogens often plays a crucial role in effective disease control.
However, reservoirs remain variously and loosely defined. We propose that reservoirs can only be under-
stood with reference to defined target populations. Therefore, we define a reservoir as one or more epide-
miologically connected populations or environments in which the pathogen can be permanently
maintained and from which infection is transmitted to the defined target population. Existence of a reser-
voir is confirmed when infection within the target population cannot be sustained after all transmission
between target and nontarget populations has been eliminated. When disease can be controlled solely by
interventions within target populations, little knowledge of potentially complex reservoir infection dynamics
is necessary for effective control. We discuss the practical value of different approaches that may be used
to identify reservoirs in the field.
nfectious agents that can infect more than one host species
are ubiquitous. Indeed, 62% of all human pathogens are clas-
sified as zoonoses (1), and 77% of livestock pathogens and 91%
of domestic carnivore pathogens infect multiple hosts. Fifty
seven of the 70 animal diseases considered to be of greatest
international importance infect multiple hosts (2). The ability of
pathogens to infect a wide range of hosts has been demonstrated
as a risk factor for disease emergence in both humans (1) and
domestic animals (2). Virtually all recent outbreaks of disease in
endangered wildlife have been caused by pathogens that can
infect other, more abundant host species 3,4.
Pathogens that infect more than one host species are by
definition likely to be encountered in several host populations,
some of which may constitute infection reservoirs. Therefore,
a key issue in the design of control measures for multihost
pathogens is defining what is meant by reservoirs of infection
and developing guidelines for their identification. 
Although many emerging diseases of human, domestic
animal, and wildlife populations are assumed to be maintained
in reservoir hosts (4), these reservoirs are rarely identified. In
recent years, several emerging infectious disease threats to
human and animal health have been managed through large-
scale measures directed at suspected reservoirs of infection.
Sometimes action arises from a clearly perceived notion of
where infection resides. For example, approximately 1 million
pigs were slaughtered in Malaysia in 1999 to control Nipah
virus (5); several million chickens were slaughtered in Hong
Kong in 1998 and 2001 to prevent a projected pandemic of
Influenza A virus (6); and several million cows were slaugh-
tered in Britain to curtail the epidemic of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, and its possible transmission to humans (7).
However, many situations exist in which the role of reservoirs
is less clear; for example, the reservoirs that harbor emerging
viruses such as Ebola and Marburg remain unknown. For
Mycobacterium bovis in the United Kingdom, a complex res-
ervoir system seems most likely, and identification of the most
important source of infection for cattle remains highly contro-
versial (8). Incomplete understanding of reservoirs has ham-
pered control of many diseases in Africa, such as Ebola virus
infection, Buruli ulcer, and rabies (9–13). 
Many different and often contradictory definitions of res-
ervoirs exist. Studies stress different characteristics of reser-
voirs, namely, that infections in reservoir hosts are always
nonpathogenic; any natural host is a reservoir host; the reser-
voir must be a different species; reservoirs are economically
unimportant hosts; or reservoirs may be primary or secondary
hosts (14–18). Some definitions imply that a reservoir com-
prises only one species; other definitions suggest that an eco-
logic system may act as a reservoir (16,18). Confusing,
conflicting, and often incomplete concepts of what constitutes
a disease reservoir result. We propose a conceptual framework
for defining and identifying reservoirs and discuss the practi-
cal value of different approaches that may be used to identify
reservoirs in the field.
Proposed Framework
We propose the following approach, which can be applied
to any disease system, for understanding the role of potentially
relevant reservoirs in that system. Figure 1 illustrates how this
framework might be applied to various systems. 
Suggested Terminology
The target population is the population of concern or inter-
est to us. All other potentially susceptible host populations that *University of Edinburgh, Roslin, U.K.
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are epidemiologically connected directly or indirectly to the
target population are nontarget populations and could poten-
tially constitute all or part of the reservoir. If we are interested
in protecting humans (the target species) from cryptosporidio-
sis, for example, the wide range of domestic and wild animal
species in the environment in which Cryptosporidim parvum
occurs (19) is the nontarget population, and those species con-
stitute potential reservoir hosts. 
In epidemiologic theory, the critical community size is the
minimum size of a closed population within which a pathogen
can persist indefinitely (20). In smaller populations the num-
ber or density of infected hosts frequently falls to low levels,
random extinction (fadeout) becomes inevitable, and the
pathogen cannot persist. Populations smaller than the critical
community size, or those rendered effectively smaller than that
critical size through control measures, we term  nonmainte-
nance populations. Pathogens will persist in populations larger
than the critical community size, and these populations we
term maintenance populations. In complex systems, pathogen
transmission between a number of nonmaintenance popula-
tions could constitute a maintenance community. Any popula-
tion that transmits infection directly to the target population,
we define as a source population. Source populations may
themselves be maintenance populations or, alternatively, may
constitute all or part of a transmission link from a maintenance
population to the target population. 
If a target population is smaller than the critical commu-
nity size and thus cannot maintain a pathogen, completely iso-
lating the target population from any transmission from
outside (ring-fencing) will cause the pathogen to become
extinct in the target population. A reservoir is present if the
pathogen repeatedly appears in such a nonmaintenance target
population. For example, completely preventing tick transmis-
sion of Borrelia spirochetes to humans from other species
would result in Lyme disease’s disappearance from humans;
thus, a reservoir must exist. This procedure for identifying res-
ervoirs will not apply to maintenance target populations. How-
ever, in practical terms reservoirs generally only become of
concern when disease control within the target population
reduces transmission within a target population to a very low
level relative to transmission from nontarget to target popula-
tions. For example, Foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) is
maintained in unvaccinated cattle populations in many parts of
Africa. The identification of wildlife reservoirs (e.g., buffalo)
generally only becomes important once vaccinated cattle can
no longer maintain infection at the population level, as is the
case, for example, in parts of southern Africa (21).
We propose that a reservoir be defined as one or more epi-
demiologically connected populations or environments in
which the pathogen can be permanently maintained and from
which infection is transmitted to the defined target population.
Populations in a reservoir may be the same or a different spe-
cies as the target and may include vector species. As long as a
reservoir constitutes a maintenance community and all popula-
tions within the maintenance community are directly or indi-
rectly connected to each other, the size of the reservoir has no
upper limit. 
Previous Concepts of Reservoirs
Previous reservoir definitions often required that the rele-
vant infectious agent be nonpathogenic to the reservoir host
species (14,15). However, pathogenicity, per se, has little bear-
ing on the persistence of infectious agents in populations.
Excluding the possibility of a reservoir solely because the
infectious agent was pathogenic to a nontarget host—as is the
case with pathogens such as Nipah, Hendra, and rabies viruses
and with bovine spongiform encephalopathy—would clearly
be a mistake.
Cleaveland and Dye (12) proposed criteria to identify res-
ervoir hosts but did not take into account multihost aspects of
reservoirs. Swinton et al. (16) used the terms reservoir and sat-
ellite to describe the dynamics of Phocine distemper virus in
the North Sea population of harbor seals (Phoca vitulina).
Infection from a satellite population effectively induces persis-
tence of infection in the reservoir population (17). Neither
population constitutes a maintenance population, but infection
Figure 1. Examples of simple and more complex target-reservoir sys-
tems. In the simplest case, A, a maintenance population transmits a
pathogen (indicated by arrows) to a target population that is smaller
than the critical community size (CCS) and therefore classified as non-
maintenance. In B, the reservoir is composed of two connected non-
maintenance populations, only one of which is the source population,
and neither of which could constitute a reservoir alone (typically akin to
some vector-borne infections). Elimination of infection in population X
will result in elimination of infection in the target. C depicts a situation in
which Y is a maintenance population, but transmission can occur
directly between Y and the target population or through another source
population, Z. Although not essential to pathogen maintenance, Z is still
part of the reservoir because it contributes to transmission of the patho-
gen to the target. In D, four nontarget populations must be included
within the reservoir if its full dynamics are to be understood. Elimination
of infection in U will not result in elimination of infection in the target, as
V is an independent maintenance population. In E, all populations are
sources. If W is not required to maintain the infection, then W falls out-
side the maintenance community but is still part of the reservoir
because it is a source. F illustrates that the target population itself may
constitute part of the reservoir and G that the target population can be a
maintenance population. PERSPECTIVE
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can be maintained in a coupled system (illustrated in Figure
1B). Both satellite and reservoir populations would be compo-
nents of our reservoir. 
In an insightful paper, Ashford recognized many of the
problems in the simplistic use of the term reservoir and pro-
posed a consistent definition of a reservoir as an “ecological
system in which the infectious agent survives indefinitely”
(18). This definition differs from ours in that it does not refer-
ence a target population and thus does not require that a reser-
voir be a source of infection for a target population. Ashford
defined reservoir hosts as those essential to maintenance of the
pathogen. We, however, argue that reservoirs may include
nonessential hosts. Excluding nonessential hosts from a reser-
voir causes two problems. First, populations harboring infec-
tion may be nonessential to maintenance yet play a major role
in transmitting the pathogen to the target population. For
example, FMDV persists indefinitely in African buffalo herds;
yet impala may constitute an important source of infection for
the cattle target population (22) (e.g., population Z in Figure
1C). Second, as Ashford recognized, the definition of reservoir
membership becomes ultimately intractable if each constituent
population in the reservoir is considered nonmaintenance.
Under these circumstances, a reservoir could be composed of
subsets of nonmaintenance populations in a variety of ways
(Figure 1E). Although a minimal definition of a reservoir is
clear, a fully inclusive definition is much less so. In Figure 1D,
population V is not an essential host; nonetheless, this popula-
tion must be considered a component of the reservoir because,
if infection is eliminated in some other parts of the reservoir,
eradication would not be achieved. For the same reason, our
concept of a reservoir differs from the notion of a critical spe-
cies assemblage, which is defined as the minimum set of host
communities in which a parasite can persist (16).
Control of Infection
Practical disease control requires answers to two ques-
tions: 1) Can an acceptable level of control be accomplished
without consideration of a reservoir? 2) If not, what popula-
tions constitute the reservoir? Given a target-reservoir system,
policies to manage infection may contain elements of three
broadly different tactics: 1)  target control: directing efforts
within the target population with no reference to the reservoir
(e.g., human vaccination against yellow fever [23]); 2) block-
ing tactics: directing control efforts at blocking transmission
between source and target populations (e.g., game fences to
control FMDV in cattle); and 3) reservoir control: controlling
infection within the reservoir (e.g., culling programs, vaccina-
tion, or treatment of reservoirs). These three approaches
require progressively increased levels of understanding of res-
ervoir structure and function.
Target control has the important advantage of requiring no
knowledge of potentially complex reservoir dynamics. A com-
plete understanding of infection dynamics within the reservoir
is also not necessary to implement blocking tactics, although
identifying source populations in the reservoir is essential. The
more precisely that source populations can be identified and
the more quantitative data that are available on their relative
contribution to transmission, the more efficient the allocation
of resources is for disease control. Reservoir control tactics
require a much more complete understanding of the structure
and transmission processes that occur within the reservoir. For
example, efforts directed at controlling infection in nonmainte-
nance components of a reservoir are unlikely to be effective if
infection in the maintenance component of the reservoir
remains uncontrolled.
The practical problem of identifying reservoirs of rabies
for humans in Zimbabwe provides a useful illustration of some
issues involved. After a rise in the incidence of jackal and dog
rabies in the 1990s, debate has centered on whether jackals
(Canis adustus) are reservoirs of this disease, an issue that has
important implications for formulating national rabies-control
programs (10,11). In Zimbabwe, domestic dogs are a mainte-
nance and source population of rabies for humans. However,
jackals account for >25% of all confirmed rabies cases in ani-
mals and are also an important source of infection for humans
(10,11). Jackals may be important components of the reservoir
as a maintenance or nonmaintenance population (Figure 2).
Because rabies can be maintained in dogs without jackals,
jackals are not an essential constituent population of the reser-
voir. But can infection persist in jackals without dogs (Figure
2B)? Jackals may constitute part of a maintenance community
in conjunction with an assemblage of other wild carnivores
(Figure 2A). The question is important because if dogs are the
only maintenance population in the reservoir, effective vacci-
nation campaigns targeted at dogs should successfully elimi-
nate human rabies from Zimbabwe. If, however, jackals
comprise all or part of a maintenance community independent
of dogs, eliminating rabies will only be successful if jackal
rabies were also controlled (10,11). The recent high incidence
of jackal rabies in Zimbabwe might suggest that jackals are
maintenance populations. A high incidence of disease alone is
neither necessary nor sufficient evidence for this claim, partic-
ularly when wide fluctuations in disease incidence occur (as
with jackal rabies). Mathematical models suggest that jackals
are probably unable to support infection without frequent rein-
troductions from outside sources (24). However, Bingham et
al. (11) argue that spatial patterns are critical and that jackal
epidemics may be sustained independently within key geo-
graphic areas. The issue can be resolved unequivocally
through implementation of a mass dog vaccination campaign,
which would be a logical first phase of a national program. If
jackal rabies persists in the absence of dog rabies, an effective
program for rabies elimination will likely need to include oral
vaccination of jackals. 
Rabies also provides an example of the need to identify a
target population when defining reservoirs. In the Serengeti
Plain in Tanzania, a distinct strain of rabies appears to be
maintained independently in spotted hyenas, without causing
them any clinical disease, and with no evidence of spillover
infection or disease occurring in any other species (within theEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 12, December 2002 1471
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limits of current knowledge) (25). By our definition, unless
this strain is identified as the cause of disease in another spe-
cies (i.e., a target population), hyenas in the Serengeti cannot
be considered as a reservoir of rabies. 
Practical Indicators To Identify Reservoirs
Newly emerging diseases usually originate from reservoirs
of infection in other host species. When such diseases first
appear, only rapid, accurate identification of the reservoir will
enable appraisal of the full range of disease-control options.
Ring-fencing is clearly impractical when no knowledge of the
reservoir populations exists, but other steps can be taken to
acquire progressively more detailed information about the res-
ervoir structure. 
Epidemiologic Evidence of Association
Accumulating epidemiologic evidence is often the best
first step in identifying a reservoir. Initially, such analyses are
often based on sparse data and are rarely published. Links
between target and reservoir may be particularly elusive when
transmission from reservoir to target is rare or sporadic, as, for
example, occurs with Ebola virus or Marburg virus (26). 
Quantitative data on risk factors for infection can be
obtained through more formal epidemiologic research, such as
case-control and cohort studies. For example, a case-control
study of Borna disease in cats indicated that hunting mice was
a risk factor and that rodents might be virus reservoirs (27).
Case-control studies have identified badgers as risk factors for
M. bovis infection in cattle in some parts of the United King-
dom (28). In other cases, putative reservoirs have been ruled
out. For example, a risk factor analysis of Helicobacter pylori
infection in young children showed that household pets were
not incriminated (29). Although such associations may suggest
a link between reservoir and target populations, further evi-
dence is required to establish the identity of a reservoir. 
Evidence of Natural Infection in Nontarget Populations
Identifying natural infection is a useful step towards deter-
mining natural hosts that may constitute potential reservoirs.
Natural infection may be determined in two ways: by identify-
ing previous infection through antibody detection or by identi-
fying current infection through isolating the infectious agent or
its genes from the host. The appropriate approach depends on
the longevity of the infection in the host  and the resources
available. For example, very large sample sizes might be
required to isolate a virus from a reservoir population; a sero-
logic survey might be less expensive and more feasible. In a
number of studies, demonstration of natural infection has been
considered strong evidence that hosts are reservoirs, e.g.,
Leishmania in small mammals in Iran (30) and hantavirus in
rodents in the Americas (31). 
Seropositivity indicates that infection has occurred. How-
ever, not all natural hosts are reservoir hosts, and to include a
nontarget population in a reservoir, evidence of transmission to
the target population, direct or indirect, must exist. Further-
more, the level of seroprevalence does not provide information
as to whether a nontarget population is a maintenance host.
High seroprevalence at a single point in time may simply indi-
cate an outbreak in the host population, rather than pathogen
persistence (32). Low seroprevalence may arise when case-
mortality rates are high in the reservoir (as in rabies infec-
tions), during an interepidemic trough, or when a pathogen
persists at a stable but low prevalence, particularly when the
duration of the infectious period is high (e.g., as in carrier ani-
mals). The critical issue is the persistence of infection in the
reservoir, which can only be determined through longitudinal
studies. 
Similar guidelines apply to data based on demonstration of
the pathogen within a host. For example, detection of Trypano-
soma brucei gambiense in wild ruminants and primates in
Figure 2. Potential complexity of rabies reservoirs in Zimbabwe. If jackals
with (A) or without (B) other wild carnivore populations constitute a main-
tenance community independent of dogs, then vaccination of dogs alone
will not result in rabies elimination in the target. If jackals do not constitute
a maintenance community independent of dogs (C), then dog vaccination
should clear rabies from the reservoir (symbols as in Figure 1).PERSPECTIVE
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West Africa has been taken as evidence of an animal reservoir
for Gambian sleeping sickness (33). However, as animal-to-
human transmission has never been demonstrated, wildlife
remain classified as potential reservoir hosts, and disease con-
trol relies on treatment of people. In contrast, for Rhodesian
sleeping sickness, isolation of T. brucei rhodesiense from a
single bushbuck in the 1950s (34) led to the assumption that
wildlife was the principal reservoir for human disease and
resulted in widespread culling of wildlife for disease control.
Only in 1966 were cattle identified as reservoir hosts (35).
Current strategies focus on treating cattle with trypanocidal
drugs (36). 
Detecting a pathogen, particularly its transmission stage, in
secretions or tissues provides supportive, but not unequivocal,
evidence that transmission to the target population can occur.
Even where experiments demonstrate that transmission is pos-
sible, it may not occur in nature for a variety of behavioral or
social reasons, because the population is below critical com-
munity size or because of constraints of pathogen life history.
Genetic/Antigenic Characteristics
Genetic and antigenic characterization of pathogens iso-
lated from different populations provides a more powerful tool
for identifying key components of reservoirs. Antigenic and
genetic variation of pathogens isolated from the target popula-
tion within the range observed in the reservoir is consistent
with reservoir-target transmission. This pattern can be demon-
strated by applying phylogenetic methods to sequence, random
amplified polymorphic DNA, or restriction fragment length
polymorphism data, or by using serum cross-reactivity studies.
Such methods have also been used to rule out important ani-
mal reservoirs of human disease in studies of Ascaris in Guate-
mala (37) and Cryptosporidium in Australia (38).
Intervention Studies 
Complete ring-fencing of target populations is the ultimate
step in identifying the existence and structure of reservoirs. In
practice, however, ring-fencing has rarely been achieved and,
as a result, even those reservoirs we consider to be most fully
understood are not usually incontrovertibly proven. Despite
this, once a potential reservoir is identified, intervention studies
can permit incidental but powerful inferences about the dynam-
ics of infection in target-reservoir systems. In many cases, dis-
ease-control programs can effectively act as intervention
studies.
Control in a reservoir host population may be achieved by
reducing host or vector density (e.g., culling possums to con-
trol tuberculosis in New Zealand [39], mosquito control for
West Nile fever, or sandfly control for cutaneous leishmaniasis
[40]). Alternatively, control measures may focus more directly
on preventing transmission from the reservoir, e.g., separation
of cattle and wildebeest to prevent transmission of malignant
catarrhal fever in East Africa (41). The success of such inter-
ventions often provides reasonable confirmation of the origi-
nal assumptions concerning transmission and maintenance of
infection in the target-reservoir system. 
Conclusions
We have a poorer understanding of the epidemiology of
multihost pathogens than simpler single-host systems. This
dearth of understanding is a particular problem with emerging
diseases, since most emerging human, domestic animal, and
wildlife diseases infect multiple hosts. Reservoirs must be
defined with reference to particular target populations. Disap-
pearance of the pathogen in the target population after ring-
fencing provides categorical evidence of the existence of a res-
ervoir and its possible identity. However, exhaustive identifi-
cation of all constituent populations of a reservoir may be
difficult. This identification need not be a management priority
if disease control is directed at the target population or at
blocking transmission between reservoir and target. For infec-
tion to be eliminated, however, disease-control measures must
be directed at the reservoir. Thus, an understanding of reser-
voir infection dynamics is essential. 
When the risks and costs of control are low, circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to justify implementing control
measures. Specifically designed intervention studies have ulti-
mately been required to determine whether a particular species
is a maintenance host, a source of infection, or one that has
been infected incidentally. Control measures are likely to be
ineffective if they are directed at components of the reservoir
that are neither maintenance hosts nor transmitters of the
pathogen to the target population. 
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